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STATE REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS
JOSEPH L. ABRAHAMt
IN 1935, Vasilios Eliopoulos of Chicago was convicted of fraudulently
receiving relief benefits.1 The charge was that he had filed a pauper's
affidavit with his application, when, in fact, he owned a substantial
certificate of deposit in the National Bank of Greece issued at its New
York office. Eliopoulos pleaded that the Greek Government had passed
a law which preventedhim from cashing his certificate. The court could
not understand how the laws of Greece concerned a deposit made in
this country, and sentenced him to one year in the house of correction.
Eliopoulos was telling the truth. The National Bank of Greece2 had
received deposits in New York illegally. He was only one of the thou-
sands of Greeks throughout the United States who had entrusted their
savings to this bank. Upon receipt of these funds the bankers removed
them to Greece, where they now remain frozen by currency restrictions.
Most of the money, estimated at as much as $25,000,000.00,1 remains
unpaid today.
That was five years ago. But New York's laws and enforcement
methods have not eliminated the means by which this bank provisioned
the coffers of a foreign country. Another alien institution could repeat
the manoeuvre now. Indeed, the possibility that other banks may choose
such a method to rehabilitate their impoverished countries after the
conclusion of the present war makes it imperative that New York
authorities direct serious attention to this potential danger.
Before analyzing the laws of New York in this respect, it will be
helpful to note briefly the policy and laws of America generally con-
cerning foreign banks. Contrary to the traditional freedom that Amer-
ican financial institutions have commonly enjoyed abroad,' foreign banks
which wish to operate in the United States face severe restrictions. By
statute expressly or by implication they can do no business at all in
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. People v. Eliopoulos, Munic. Ct., Chicago, (Cr. Br. 1935) Case No. 1344447.
2. See pp. 352-355 and note 57 infra.
3. The exact amount of the deposits thus blocked within Greece is unonown. It has
been estimated as between "four, five and six million dollars", Marley v.. National Bank
of Greece, 20 F. Supp. 214, 215 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), and $25,865,906.00. Rroanr o.- BmL
RxAxrm To Tm REGulATIoN oF Secuaa Dmars Dtya To Rnrrr B.a.;as n Form---
ExcHANr (Greek Government Press, 1936) 116-117.
4. LEAGuE op NATIONS Docu-nsTr, E. F. S. 80. A 46 (1921) 4-16; Pnurs, Tim
FOSEIG" Fr.Arsiox or AwtaILcAi B.%axs (1927) 176-191.
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35 states.' Six6 permit them to conduct a limited business, excluding
the receipt of deposits, but in two' of' these the scope allowed is so
narrow as to make operation financially prohibitive. Only five states8
5. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 6354; Aurz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§ 255; id. (Courtright, Supp. 1936) §§ 209, 215; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 700;
COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1939) c. 18, § 61, c. 41, § 110; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp.
1939) § 1248e; DEL. REV. CODE (1935) § 2253; FLA. Cosn,. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skillman,
Supp. 1939) §§ 6070, 6115; GA. CODE AN r. (Park & Strozier, 1939) §§ 13-204, 22-1502;
GA. Acrs 1929, pp. 214, 215 (unconsolidated); IDAUO CODE ANN. (1932) § 25-102; ILL.
REV. STAT. (1937) c. 32, §§ 157.102, 157.103, c. 16Y2 , § 9; OPINION ATr'y GEN, ILL. (1938)
No. 1094; INDIANA STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1939) §§ 18-2301, 18-2302, and note 76 infra;
IOWA CODE (1935) § 9258; KAw. GEN. STAT. AN. (Corrick, 1935) §§ 9-101, 9-120, 17-505;
Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, Supp. 1939) § 598 b-4; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 57, § 3; Micit.
STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1939) § 23.847; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) § 7671;
MONT. REV. CODES Arn. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 6014.2, 6014.33; NED. Comxn,,
STAT. (1929) § 8-115; id. (Kyle, Supp. 1939) § 8-116; NaV. Comrp. LAWS (Hillyer, 1939)
§ 747.46; N. H. PuB. LAW (1926) c. 260, § 24, as amended by Laws 1937, c. 103, § 9;
N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 13-103; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1939)
§ 220 (r), informal Opinion Att'y Gen. N. C., Mar. 7, 1940; N. D. Laws 1931, c. 96,
§ 7, superseding N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (1913) § 5177; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, Supp.
1938) § 9163 a, as amended by S. Laws 1939, c. 40 art. 2 § 1; PA. STAT, ANtN. (Purdon,
1939) tit. 7, § 819-1505; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1938) c. 144, § 4; S. D. CODE (1939) §§ 6.0401,
6.0403; Tax. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 490; VT. Pu. LAWS (1933) § 5992; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1938) § 4149(3); W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1937)
§§ 3139, 3140; xIs. STAT. ANN. (1939) §§ 224.01, 224.03; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right, 1931) §§ 10-101, 10-105, 10-111.
6. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 652, § 7 (can buy, sell, pay or collect bills
of exchange, issue letters of credit, receive money for transmission and transmit It and
make loans); Mo. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1939) §§ 5394, 9396 (same powers as Cal., supra);
N. Y. BANKINo LAW § 200 et seq. (similar to Cal. See pp. 349-351 and notes 37 el seq.
for full discussion of New York laws); WAsH REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1939) § 3247
(can lend money on mortgage securities, and buy and sell exchange, coin, bullion or
securities). See note 7 infra for Louisiana and Ohio, and see note 8 infra in reference to
California and Washington.
7. In Louisiana, foreign banking corporations can lend money and deal in foreign
exchange, but for this privilege they must pay an annual license fee of $500, plus 5% of
the gross interest earned. LA. GE. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939) §§ 541, 605; LA. CONST.
ART. X, § 9. OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1939) § 710-40 excepts all banking powers
other than the lending of money.
8. MAss. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1939) c. 167, §§ 37-45A (on equal basis with domestic
banks); N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 17, c. 16 (no foreign corporation shall transact any
business "except to the extent that similar corporations of New Jersey are permitted to
transact business in" the domiciliary state of the foreign corporation). ORE. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1935) §§ 22-1301-22-1309 (almost equal basis with domestic banks; capital and
surplus within state must equal 10% of deposits, cannot advertise greater amount of capital
or surplus than it so has within state, but can accept bills of exchange on basis of entire
paid up capital and surplus); TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1938) §§ 4118, 5951, 5956;
Deposit Bank of Monroe Co., Ky. v. Cherry, 20 Tenn. 305, 319, 98 S. W. (2d) 521, 525
(1936) semble (can qualify under general foreign corporation statutes); UTAn REv. STAT.
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authorize the highly desirous deposit function. In the two0 remaining
jurisdictions their status is ambiguous. Thus foreign banks are barred
from such important and populous centers as Chicago, Philadelphia
and Detroit, and in New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco they
cannot accept money for deposit.
Several reasons support these apparently discriminatory regulations.
One commonly advanced is that most aliens and citizens of foreign
extraction have known predilections for trading with and trusting people
of their own nationality, whose customs and language they readily under-
stand."0 Such persons often lend themselves to patriotic appeals on
behalf of afflicted fatherlands. Against these advantages peculiar to
foreign banks, our states must protect their own institutions.
These grounds alone present no serious danger, unless exploited for
illegal purposes. Why shouldn't foreigners and foreign bankers enjoy
these natural benefits on strange soil? Moreover, the exclusion of foreign
banks does not eliminate them. Such foreign institutions can merely
organize state banks, control them by stock ownership, 1' and staff the
subsidiaries with aliens. Few state laws prohibit this procedure.'
The other reasons advanced are more impelling. Most foreign coun-
tries do not practice separation of Bank and State so definitely as does
America. This is especially true in the totalitarian states,1 and in several
Axr-. (1933) §§ 7-1-27, 7-3-4 (must comply with all laws of Utah relating to banks and
all its laws relating to foreign corporations). To this list should be added California and
Washington, where foreign branches which were receiving deposits when the present bank-
ing laws (referred to in note 6, supra) became effective are permitted to continue such
business. CAL. GEr:. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 652, § 7; W,%sm Rv. STr. A.i. (Reming-
ton, 1939) § 3248. Only one institution in each state is so operating now.
9. AID. A-m. CODE (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 11, §§ 6, 52, 78 imply rather strongly that
only Maryland Banking Corporations can do business within the state. S. C. CoDo (1932)
§§ 7764, 7776, 7836 intimate that if a foreign corporation' could enter the state, it would
have to maintain at each office, or allocate to each, the same amount of capital and surplus
as is required for establishing an independent state bank.
10. See e.g. Journal of Commerce, July 14, 1939, p. 2, col. 4, where it is surg-sted
that "foreign holders of balances in the United States would be reluctant to entrust their
investment accounts to American concerns simply because in doing so they would have
to deal with strangers." See also Fanrcam, Ihnscrno.- (Rev. ed. 1933) 231.
11. In 1935, there were 13 such subsidiaries in the United States having a total of
35 offices. Phelps, Foreign Banks in the United States (1935) 28 Bu.En c, J. Am. Bx=:.n's'
Ass'N 30.
12. Some states either regnlate the relations between parent and subsidiary, or prohibit
or limit the holding of stock of one bank by another. Such statutes are not aimed at
foreign institutions, but seek to prevent "chain" or "group" banking within the state,
Legis. (1935) 48 HMAv. L. REv. 659, 664, 666. One state exprfssly precludes domestic
and foreign corporations from doing "group" or "chain" banking. lM1xs. Coon Am.
(Supp. 1939) § 671.
13. In U. S. S. R. the banks remain conventional joint-stock companies, but the gov-
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weaker nations where one or more banks may have a virtual mortgage
on the whole economic life. In such instances, the banks could use, and'
have used, 4 their American offices for the selfish manipulation of foreign
exchange regardless of the economic injury to us.
Then too, every state has numerous protective laws concerning super-
vision, inspection and reserve requirements to a degree unknown in other
countries.' 5 It would be practically impossible to extend the force of
these to main offices abroad, and we would have to forego much of our
public control over foreign banks. This would not only handicap our
rigidly regulated local institutions, but would also deprive American
depositors in foreign banks of the safety our rules assure.10
Today foreign currency and exchange restrictions17 are so prevalent
that the free interchange of mohey across national lines is almost non-
existent. This presents the constant and serious danger that local de-
positors in foreign banks will find their funds blocked within another
country, as did the depositors in the National Bank of Greece.
These considerations combined present a strong case for the exclusion
of alien banks. It is highly improbable, however, that such arguments
evoked the extant restrictive statutes.'8 Most of these laws have been
effective for years, or are codifications of previous policy, and they strike
banks of sister states with equal vigor as those of foreign countries. 10
ernment owns the entire stock. The state guides the policies according to its demands.
In Germany and Italy, although private property still exists, the Nazi and Fascist govern-
ments own a large percentage of the capital of banks, and the bankers must act as the
respective governments direct. Plaut, Banking under Dictatorship (London, 1939) 99 TnE,
ACCOUNTANT 467-469.
14. (1932) REPORT OF THE GovERNOR OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE, 33, In
which the governor characterized the loss for persons outside of Greece resulting from the
decrees mentioned on page 343, supra, as a necessary sacrifice by "Greeks abroad on behalf
of their afflicted country", and he exhorted "let them consider this loss as a national
contribution, as it really is."
15. FOsTER & ROGERS, MONEY AND BANKrG (1936) 355. The numerous statutes are
excellently tabulated in Beaty, Laws Regukating Bank Charters (1936) 53 RAND McNAuav
BANrKERS MONTHLY 410-417.
16. CHA-rBER OF Cow2rERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LAWS AND PRACTICES Ant miciin
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN BRANCHES OF BANKS (1923) 21.
17. These currency laws are compiled verbatim in BANx 'OR INTERNATIONAL SEVTrIE-
MENTS, FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS IN THE DIPFFRENT COUNTRIES (1931). For a
convenient digest see DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
ComtmaRCE, SPECIAL CIRCULAR No. 427 (1939). The legal and practical difficulties resulting
from these laws are innumerable. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MoNEY (1938) 53,
258-277; Note (1939) YALE L. J. 451. Rather recently, Sweden broadened her control
over certain "accounts of non-residents in Swedish banks". N. Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1940,
p. 35, col. 1.
18. PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 194.
19. In only Arkansas and Indiana do banks of foreign countries enjoy less favorable
(Vol. 9
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Many of them supplement statutes regulating branch banking by domestic
banks, even within the state of organization.20
It is safe to assume that two overlapping and typically American forces
induced the present laws. The first is the historic antipathy to branch
banking of any kind, dating back over a hundred years.2 ' This objection
arises, not only because branch banking complicates supervision, but also
because it tends towards monopoly, permits drainage of funds from local
centers to metropolitan districts, and diminishes the personal elements
in banking 2 The second is that we have no definite national banking
policy. Instead, we find forty-eight states each jealously guarding its
right to establish and regulate all financial institutions within its borders.
To permit unlimited foreign banking would tend to nullify this right' 4
Indeed, it was not until 1933 that a National Bank organized under the
laws of the United States was permitted to have American branches
outside of the city of its main office.2 1 Even now such branches must
locate within the state where the Bank is situated, and then only if the
local banks of the particular state have that authority by state law
expressly, and not merely by implication. 0 It is true that since 1930
treatment than those of another state. The former by statute excludes all foreign corpora-
tions except those authorized under the laws of "another State". A x. Dic. STAT. (Pope,
1937) § 700. L . STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1939) §§ 18-2301 et seq. empower foreign corpora-
tions to engage in banking business, but limit the definition of foreign corporations to
those organized under the laws of any other "state". The banking authorities of both
states in informal opinions have interpreted these provisions as excluding corporations of
foreign countries.
20. Nine states prohibit branch banking of all kinds, seventeen restrict branches to
limited areas within the state, while seventeen also permit state wide branch banking, and
five states have no legislation, 2 C. C. H. 1933 Banking Law State Serv. U 17,G00.
21. LEAGuE OF NAroNs Doc mT, E. F. S. 80. A 46 (1921) 13.
22. WIrIs & CmPassN, THE BANI G SITUATION (1934) 417-419.
23. CHA-NT,, Co.cqM-"nAor oF B.AX, G (1934) 12, 175; League of Nations, loc.
ct. supra note 21. See also note 15 supra. Some states' constitutions manifest this attitude.
Thy. CoNsT. ArL XVI, § 16. Others have statutory declarations of policy. N.Y. B,'1% -
uG LAw § 10.
24. OPIONro ATT'" Gma. ILL. (1938) No. 1094, at 49.
25. Since the effective date of the Fmm.xL RxsEVE AcT in 1914, National Banks could
open branches outside of the United States. 38 STAT. 273 (1913), 12 U. S. C. §§ 601-605
(1934). But until the McFADDEN ACT, 44 STAT. 1228 (1927), allowed them to establish
branches within the city of the home office, they lacked authority to have any branches
in this country. First National Bank of St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 (1924), Note
(1924) 37 HAnv. L. REv. 899. The NAToN-AL BAN G AcT of 1933, 48 Sr, . 1S9, 190
(1933), 12 U. S. C. § 36(c)(2) (1934), was the first to permit their creation in the United
States beyond such city. Boeckel, Expansion of Branch Banting (1937) 1 EDrronr.AL
REsaancH REPORTs 135, 148.
26. 48 STAT. 189, 190 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 36 (c) (2) (1934). Before the enactment
of this statute, however, in isolated cases a few National Banks assumed the right to
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there has been a marked legislative tendency towards wider branch
banking." But the state banking supervisory authorities, as well as the
bankers themselves, still vigorously oppose branch banking across state
lines.2s
Foreign bankers hardly appreciate the impact of these two forces,
especially since branch banking and strongly centralized organizations
characterize many foreign systems.20  At times these bankers have
assailed our restrictive legislation as an unfair national policy aimed to
exclude them from a profitable field. This attitude was very articulate
just after World War J.30 The Latin American countries particularly
condemned our refusal to practice "reciprocity" in banking, and a few
of our own bankers and journalists voiced support." Some of these
nations even enacted or planned retaliatory legislation.32 Such reaction,
however, was not widespread,3 and in 1936 American banks were oper-
conduct interstate branches. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on
H. R. 141, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) 462. One example is the First Camden National
Bank & Trust Company, of Camden, N. J., which has operated a branch in Philadelphia
since 1813. Such branch now is legal, however, since the Act of 1927 provided that any
National Bank which continuously maintained not more than one branch for a period
of more than 25 years immediately preceding the approval of the act may continue to'
operate such branch. 44 STAr. 1228 (1927) 12 U. S. C. § 36 (a) (1934).
27. Boeckel, supra note 25, at 150. As of December 31, 1929, 22 states prohibited
branch banking of all kinds, 10 permitted branches in limited areas within the state; only
nine allowed state-wide branches, while seven had no legislation on the subject. 16 FED.
REs. BULL. (1930) 258. Compare this with the present day summary in note 20, supra.
28. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 36TH ANNUAL CONVENTION or THE NATIONAL AssocIATIoN o
SUPERVISORS or STATE BANKS (1937) 37; Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 1939, p. 7, col. 3;
N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1940, p. 35, col. 8. The Connecticut Bankers' Association sponsored
the recent restrictive statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 1248 e, referred to In
note 5, supra, to prevent National Banks located without the state from having branches
within Connecticut. This anticipates a federal act authorizing such branches where not
prohibited by state law. Conn. Bankers' Assn., DIGEST OF LAws PASSED ny GENERAL
Ass~mBLY or CONNECTICUT AFFECTING BANKING (1939) 19. It seems that Congress could
validly authorize branches of National Banks across state lines, even though every state
forbade such. Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 283 (1896); Legis. (1932) 46
HARv. L. Ray. 143, 145.
29. CHAPMAN, CONCENTRATION OF BANKING (1935) 11; WILLIS & BECKnART, FOnEIoN
BANKING SvsTENis (1929).
30. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 16, at 23-25,
31. Ibid.; Grahame, Foreign Banks in the United States (1918) 26 PAN-AMEniCAN
MAGAZINE 249-250; Reciprocity in Interest in Banking (1919) 30 PAN-ANrrMICAN MAoAZINE
35-37; Retaliatory Policy against Foreign Branches of American Banks (1920) 101 BANKlERns'
MACAZINE 540-541.
32. See authorities cited supra note 31.
33. But a potential danger of retaliation still exists in some countries. Thus in Italy
and Japan the Ministry of Finance, in granting licenses to foreign banks, may take In
[Vol. 9
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ating 203 offices in 35 countries 4 About the same time, banks of 14
different countries had 79 offices of some type in the United States.
The deepest concern of the foreign bankers, as well as the public at
large, is the laws of New York. The importance of New York City as
a financial and monetary center and its concentration of alien population
almost compels many foreign banks to establish direct contact with the
United States through offices there. Of the 42 licensed offices of foreign
banks in the United States, 31 are in New York City2 These serve as
American bases for their international business and domestic activities
throughout the nation. If New York's laws are too repressive, their
business all over the country suffers. On the other hand, inadequacy of
these laws or improper enforcement affect the entire United States.
For many years the laws of New York have reserved the cream of
the banking business for its own institutions. Only New York state
banks, and National and Federal Reserve banks, can receive deposits,
make discounts or issue notes or other evidence of debt to be loaned
or put in circulation as money.3 7 Banks of sister states and foreign
countries can obtain only limited licenses issued on yearly bases to
operate "agencies". These agencies can buy, sell and collect bills of
exchange, issue letters of credit, receive money for transmission and
transmit it by draft, check, cable or otherwise, and make loans, but
they cannot receive deposits or make discounts. 8
An applicant for such a license must furnish the Superintendent of
account the treatment their banks receive in the applicant's country. ALrrz, Corr, D,%u
& Wfrmm=oF, Coarnc=a B ANK=G LLisATiov AND CorOL (1938) 257-258. 291.
34. American Banking Abroad (1937) 30 BAnxxo, J. Aar B."Li-rns' Ass'.N. 43.
35. PinuPs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 30.
36. (1940) N. Y. LEo. Doc. No. 24, 44. These figures exclude three banks of other
states of the United States. One foreign institution has two offices, and one agency was
licensed since the publication of the Document. The other eleven are located as follows:
San Francisco-5; Los Angeles-2; Seattle-2; Boston and Portland, Ore., one each.
37. N. Y. BA.KING LAW § 131. See note 3S, infra.
38. N. Y. BA-NKING LAw §§ 131, 200-204; Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank
of Greece, 166 Misc. 190, 193, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 155, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 254 App.
Div. 728, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 1004 (Ist Dep't 1938). Nor can foreign banks conduct a
general trust business in New York. They may act only as executor and trustee when so
appointed by a will, then subject to limitations. N. Y. B.%,;m= L.w § 131 (3), (4). In
addition to banks, licensed steamship, express and railroad companies may engage in the
transmission of funds. N. Y. GE-. Corp. L.w § 18. Prior to the pasage of Laws of 1921,
c. 354 (N. Y. Gr.n;. Bus. LAw §§ 160-166) these companies acted without regulation, and
appointed agents indiscriminately without assuming responsibility for their conduct. As
a result there were hundreds of agents and sub-agents who fleeced hepless immigrants of
thousands of dollars. While this latter law helped to cure the abuses, it is quite insufficient.
Attempts for more stringent legislation have all failed. Report of the Joint Committee on
the Expoitation of Immzigrants (1924) N-w Yoax Srxr n LT. Doc. No. 76 1-43.
19401
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Banks satisfactory proof of the nature of its business and financial
condition, and designate the superintendent as its attorney upon whom
may be served all process in any action against it by residents of the
state. The bank also has to file a certificate stating the amount of its
paid, and unpaid subscribed, capital, and the actual value of its assets
which is required to be at least $250,000 more than its liabilities. With
this it must submit a detailed financial statement of a date within sixty
days of the time of the application. It is assessed an annual fee of $250.0
Once a license is granted, the agency is under the supervision of the
State Banking Department, but no more extensively so than a New York
state institution. The agency must file reports when requested,4" and
the superintendent has power to examine it to determine whether it has
violated any law, or for any other purpose.41 He may revoke its license
if it engages in unauthorized practices,42 and he may take possession of
its property and business43 for the same reasons as he may those of a
state bank. In addition, he may do so if the foreign corporation is in
liquidation elsewhere. In either case the claims of creditors of the New
York agency are preferred against the assets of the corporation within
the state.
Nothing prevents an agency from sharing offices or personnel with a
state bank, and it may use the word "bank" or its equivalent as freely
as an uninhibited domestic bank. The agency is not required to indicate
publicly that its functions are limited or that it cannot accept deposits
or make discounts, except that it must display its limited license "con-
spicuously" in its place of business.44
Foreign bankers apparently find these agencies profitable, for thirty
banks representing eleven countries have such offices in New York
today.45 Their principal business constitutes dealing in foreign exchange,
effecting remittances between the United States and foreign countries,
and encouraging and financing foreign trade. The uncertainties of Spring
and Summer of last year and the subsequent outbreak of war have not
diminished the efficacy of such offices, but on the contrary have added
new functions. It is well known that Hitler's pre-war and present policies
have sent an enormous flow of European capital in search of American
sanctuary, and such agencies are invaluable in acting as custodians and
39. N. Y. BANxxi LAW §§ 26, 200, 201.
40. Id. § 204.
41. Id. § 36 (4).
42. Id. § 40.
43. Id. § 606 (4).
44. Id. § 202 (1).
45. See note 36 supra.
[Vol. 9
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investors of such funds and securities. Indeed, the main purpose of the
agency of the Swiss Bank Corporation, it was explained, is to act as
custodian of the Bank's gold,40 and the agency of the Societ6 Generale
de Paris was reportedly opened to act as financial agent for the now
defunct French Buying Commission 47 -a direct outgrowth of the war.
Several other commercial banks in central and European countries during
the past year have weighed the possibilities of establishing agencies for
similar reasons.4 The English bankers, on the other hand, who already
operate six agencies in New York, have seen no need for new affiliates.40
If a foreign bank does not obtain an agency license and thus does not
subject itself to the supervision of the Banking Department, it cannot
exercise any of the powers explained above and it has no right and
privilege to transact business here.50 If it does not maintain an office
in the state, however, it may make loans secured by a mortgage on real
property, accept assignments of mortgages covering real property situated
in the state, and also make loans through corporations authorized to do
banking in the state.51 But if it wishes to do more it must obtain a
license. There is no statutory authority for a "representative" or "repre-
sentative office".0 -
In an effort to prevent unlicensed banking, the law provides that no
person or corporation, except a National Bank and Federal Reservq
Bank or a corporation authorized by the Superintendent to transact
business in New York, shall use any office sign at the place where such
business is transacted having on it any artificial or corporate name, or
other words indicating that such place is the office of a bank. Nor can
such person or corporation use or circulate any letterheads, circulars or
any written or printed paper, having thereon any words of that nature.
Some foreign banks have found it desirable to organize and control
through stock ownership a domestic bank," either alone or in conjunction
46. N. Y. Times, July 30, 1939, § 3, p. 4, cols. 1, 2; Journal of Commerce, Oct. 14,
1939, p. 4, col. 5. The Credit Suisse, another large Swiss bank, organized a non-banking
corporation in New York to prevent its foreign assets "from falling into the hands of
another government". Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1939, p. 5, col. 6. This banh, however,
subsequently established an agency for its purpose. N. Y. Times, May 5, 1940, § 3, p. 5.
cols. 4-6.
47. American Banker, Nov. 4, 1939, p. 3, col. 1.
48. N. Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1939, p. 23, cols. 6, 7.
49. American Banker, Aug. 24, 1939, p. 7, col. 1.
S0. N. Y. BAN'-G LAW §§ 131, 202 (2); N. Y. Gr.. CoRp. LAyW § 18.
51. N. Y. BAN=G LAw § 200 (last paragraph).
52. See pp. 360-361 and notes 88, S9 infra.
53. N. Y. BA, G LAW §§ 132, 150; N. Y. PAL LAW § 302.
54. Some of such subsidiaries are: Bank of Athens Trust Co., Bank of Montreal Trust
Co., Banco DiNapoli Trust Co. of New York and Hellenic Bank Trust Co.
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with an agency. No statute prevents this. The subsidiary is subject to
the New York banking laws to the same extent as, and no more than,
any other domestic bank, and it must maintain its funds and business
entirely separate. All directors, except one, are required to be citizens
of the United States and at least a majority of them must be citizens
and residents of New York State.' The parent bank, by virtue of its
stock control, becomes liable to examination by the state banking
authorities,"0 if they can devise means to examine a banking office located
in a foreign state or country.
Such, in summary, are the present New York laws affecting foreign
banks. They were substantially identical in 1930 when the National
Bank of Greece pierced them quite successfully and revealed their flaws.
In 1926, this bank5" opened an agency in New York City under a limited
license, but four years later it inaugurated a deposit business, a pursuit
specifically reserved for New York bankers. To do this it organized a
New York state bank named the Hellenic Bank Trust Company, fur-
nisfiing $1,500,000 capital in return for 95% of the stock. Since the
Hellenic Bank was a domestic corporation, it could receive deposits,
provided it maintained them according to law. Naturally, this did not
empower the Hellenic to act as deposit conduit into its foreign parent.
After the formation of the new bank, the National Bank of Greece
continued its agency, and the Hellenic opened offices with it. Indeed,
the two banks had not only the same address, but also the same telephone
number, the same management and the same personnel. The Governor
and Sub-Governor of the National Bank of Greece became directors of
the Hellenic, although neither had ever been in this country. 8 There
55. N. Y. BANKING LAW § 116 (4).
56. Id. § 36 (6) (b).
57. The story of the National Bank of Greece as herein set forth is based on the
following sources: (1) the decisions and records in: Marley v. National Bank of Greece,
20 F. Supp. 214 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Eliopoulos v. National Bank of Greece, 240 App. Div.
968, 1033, 268 N. Y. Supp. 909, 984 (Ist Dep't 1933); Society Milion Athena v. National
Bank of Greece, 166 Misc. 190, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 155 (Sup. Ct. 1937), afj'd 254 App. Div.
728, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 1004 (Ist Dep't 1938), (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. R-v. 451-453; id.
169 Misc. 882, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 177 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd 256 App. Div. 804, 9 N. Y. S.
(2d) 895 (1st Dep't 1939), modified and aff'd 281 N. Y. 282, 22 N. E. (2d) 374 (1939) ;
(2) the lengthy examination before trial in Geogas v. National Bank of Greece, 249 App.
Div. 813, 293 N. Y. Supp. 934 (1st Dep't 1937). Because of the diversity of the source
material, it will be impractical to give a footnote reference for each statement as made.
Such references will be given only for matters which seem to demand them and for state-
ments based on sources other than those listed above.
58. Examination before trial, p. 86, Geogas v. National Bank of Greece, 249 App. Dlv.
813, 293 N. Y. Supp. 934 (1st Dep't 1937). See the report on the Hellenic in Moony,
IVANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, BANKS, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE, INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1933)
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was almost a total merger of identities. Paradoxically, the same person
as president of the Hellenic Bank Trust Company had authority to
receive deposits, but as chief agent of the National Bank of Greece he
could do so only if he violated the law.
Immediately the two institutions acting as a unit undertook a joint
advertising campaign for deposits, by joint newspaper advertisements
mailed throughout the country-all in a foreign language. The keynote
was that the two banks were one and the same, that customers could
deal with either bank without distinction, and that the Hellenic was a
"branch" of the National Bank of Greece operating legally according to
New York laws. The banks promised interest as high as 54 15. They
appealed to the little man and the thrifty, and baited the patriotic Greek
with patriotic slogans. They bannered the word "savings" illegally,"
and stated that the National Bank of Greece did not belong to private
interests but to the "Greek Nation". Actually, it belonged to private
stockholders who were receiving dividends of 340%.0 The bankers
promised to repay deposits in New York in the same kind of dollars as
made on two days notice, without any expense.
Thousands thronged the New York office. Others responded by mail.
The depositor received a certificate in exchange for his money. This
paper bore only the name of the National Bank of Greece, which had
no authority to issue it. Nothing on the certificate suggested that the
Hellenic Bank shared in the transaction, and the deposits were not
entered on its books, although it alone could receive them legally.0 ' The
certificate was dated "at Athens", but the words "issued at New York"
were stamped in. It was signed and delivered by an officer in New York.
1994, which discloses that three of the nine directors were residents of Athens, Greece.
This was a blatant violation of N. Y. BAxnr, LAw § 123 (amended and renumbered as
§ 116 (4), cited note 55, supra), which required each director to be a dtiz~n of the United
States and at least three-fourths of them to be residents of New York or a contiguous state.
59. No bank or trust company or corporation other than a savings bank or a savings
and loan association "shall make use of the word 'saving' or 'savings' or their equivalent
in its banking business, or use any advertisement containing the word 'saving' or 'savings".
N. Y. BANEa G LAw § 258 (1) (formerly § 279).
60. Examination before trial, pp. 10-11, Geogas v. National Bank of Greece, 249 App.
Div. 813, 293 N. Y. Supp. 934 (1st Dep't 1937); MooDY, MANLAL, op. cit. supra note 58,
at 1630.
61. In justice to the Hellenic Bank Trust Company, which is a solvent going institu-
tion today, it should be noted that the Hellenic was, and still is, accepting deposits in the
regular course of its own business, which have always been received and maintained
according to law. Its business in this connection was separate and apart from the activities
of the National Bank of Greece mentioned in the text. These legitimate deposits are in
no wise affected by the Greek currency restrictions and are guaranteed by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.
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The certificate undertook to repay in the same currency as the deposit
at the main office in Athens, or at any branch on demand.
As if to add to our financial crisis of the early 1930's, the National
Bankers of Greece removed these deposits as received to their home
offices beyond the jurisdiction and supervision of the State of New York.
Then in 1932, the Greek government issued a decree which translated
all foreign currency deposits in Greek banks into Drachmae, cutting
the American deposits to two-thirds of their value. This same decree
banned the exportation of foreign exchange from Greece, and prevented
the return of the dollar deposits to the United States, where by law they
should have remained the entire time.
In March 1933, at the suggestion of the Banking Department, the
National Bank of Greece terminated its license and discontinued its
New York agency. It also revoked the power of attorney appointing the
Superintendent of Banks as its agent for service of process. About the
same time, it disposed of all of its assets here, including its stock in the
Hellenic Bank Trust Company. It did maintain a "special representa-
tive", although there was no statutory authority for such. Soon there-
after, the certificates of deposit commenced to mature, and many deposi-
tors presented them to the Hellenic and the special representative for
redemption. The bankers however, instead of paying, offered bank books
of the National Bank of Greece issued in terms of the de-valued Drachma.
Numerous depositors acquiesced in this conduct. But a few sued
immediately and obtained summary judgments, in spite of the bankers'
attempt to interject the Greek decrees as a defense. 2 Others sued later
and had difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over the Greek bank, because
the authority of the special representative had been withdrawn. The
courts held, however, that service of process upon the Superintendent of
Banks as statutory agent was good, although the power of attorney
appointing him as such had been purportedly revoked"q--this for the
reason that the causes of action accrued in New York and arose out of
contracts made while the National Bank of Greece was doing business
there.14 By the terms of the statute"0 this service favored New York
residents only, but the courts protected the non-resident plaintiffs on the
62. One of these cases was Eliopoulos v. National Bank of Greece, 240 App. Div. 968,
1033, 268 N. Y. Supp. 909, 984 (1st bep't 1933).
63. Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 166 Misc. 190, 2 N. Y. S.
(2d) 155 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd 254 App. Div. 728, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 1004 (Ist Dep't
1938), (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 451-453.
64. Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 166 Misc. 190, 195-196, 2
N. Y. S. (2d) 155, 159-161 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
65. N. Y. BANYIUKc LAW § 200 (3).
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ground that the National Bank of Greece was still doing business in
New York at the time through the Hellenic as its agent, and service on
the latter was valid.66
Strangely enough, none of the plaintiffs who thus perfected jurisdiction
secured a judgment. A few of them were dragged through the courts
for over three years before they settled on the best terms available.07
Some rather important law was enunciated during the litigation, however,
which is of general interest. In one case the State Supreme Court 3 had
upheld the complaint as stating a valid cause of action in behalf of all
of the depositors and creditors, and had also installed a receiver of the
assets of the National Bank of Greece within New York. The Appellate
Division unanimously affirmed,G but the Court of Appeals made serious
modifications.7 The latter approved the complaint, but merely as stating
separate causes of action in favor of each individual depositor, which
had to be separately alleged, on the ground that the depositors did not
have the requisite common interest to permit one to sue on behalf of all.
It further ruled that there was no authority to appoint a receiver or
liquidator of the assets in New York of a foreign corporaton under the
circumstances, especially since there was no statute granting such power
and the corporation was not in liquidation at its domicile.
The court did indicate that perhaps the Superintendent of Banks had
power to act as statutory liquidator under Section 606 (4) of the Banking
Law,7' although the bank had ceased to do business in New York and
was no longer licensed. But at most, the creditors themselves could
obtain a judicial receivership only after the superintendent had refused
66. Society filion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 166 AIsc. 190, 197-20a, 2 N.
Y. S. (2d) 155, 161-164 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
67. Thus Thomas and Mary Geogas were in court from October 1936 until November
1939, in an effort to retrieve $8,00D they deposited in 1931. During the litigation there
were five different appeals, four of which were taken by the bankers, and all of which
eventually terminated in favor of the depositors. Even -o the case never reached the
stage of trial. The plaintiffs ultimately settled for 40% in cash and 607 in depoit credit
in Greece. This latter sum cannot be removed from Greece unless the extant exchange
restrictions are lifted. See Records: Geogas v. National Bank of Greece, Sup. Ct., N. Y.
Co., No. 648 (1937); Hartman v. National Bank of Greece, Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., No. 27745
(1939).
68. Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 169 Misc. 882, 9 N. Y. S. (2d)
177 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
69. 256 App. Div. 804, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 895 (1st Dep't 1939).
70. 281 N. Y. 282, 22 N. E. (2d) 374 (1939).
71. This section provides in part that the "superintendent may also forthwith take
possession of the business and property in this state of any foreign banking corporation,
-which has been licensed by him under the provisions of this chapter ' if certain unhealthy
conditions appear to exist. (Italics inserted).
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to proceed.72 The superintendent had taken no action thus far, nor
expressed his refusal to do so. This decision terminated the efforts of
the depositors to restore their savings, and they now await the pleasures
of foreign bankers and a foreign government to refund their money.
Thus we see that New York's seemingly repressive regulations in actuality
have allowed one alien corporation liberties unknown to domestic insti-
tutions. There is evidence, too, that the National Bank of Greece was
not the only foreign banking corporation receiving deposits in New York.
Only recently the writer found bank deposit slips in the office of another
such agency. It is difficult to conceive what purpose such slips might
serve other than to assist the making of forbidden deposits.
The New York Legislature should take immediate steps to remedy the
statutory and administrative defects which the aforementioned cases
exposed and to dispel all possibilities of repetition. This is no easy task.
Above all, the legislators should protect our citizens and alien residents
against further exploitation. But at the same time they should not drive
the foreign banking offices from New York. These offices are valuable
for our foreign trade. The many legitimate banks should not suffer
because one, or perhaps a few others, acted illegally. Then too, we should
not unnecessarily subject American banks with foreign branches to
retaliatory laws.73 The legislature should conduct a comprehensive in-
vestigation, determine all the facts, and balance the conflicting considera-
tions before enacting any new laws.
There seem to be at least three courses of action: (1) to exclude
foreign banks and subsidiaries entirely; (2) to liberalize the present
restrictive laws so as to authorize the receipt of deposits, but with proper
precautions; (3) to maintain the status quo to the extent of converting
the existing restrictions and safeguards into reality.
It requires no legislative inquiry to eliminate the first alternative as
foo stringent, especially if it is possible to solve the problem by more
moderate means and without risking injury to our international trade
and banking.
The correct procedure may well be to grant alien banks wider privi-
leges74 as suggested in the second course. In this connection it is inter-
72. The depositors had contended that the statute did not include a foreign corporation
which, no longer licensed and no longer doing business, had withdrawn from the state
with the superintendent's consent. See the italicised phrases in note 71, supra. They
further argued that if the statute did include such corporation, the right of the super-
intendent was not exclusive so as to eliminate a judicial receivership on the application of
creditors. Brief for Respondents, pp. 86-89, Society Milion Athena v. National Bank Jf
Greece, 281 N. Y. 282, 22 N. E. (2d) 374 (1939).
73. See pp. 348-349 and notes 31-33 supra.
74. Professor C. W. Phelps, who made a comprehensive study of foreign banking in
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esting to note that the National Bank of Greece was able to accomplish
its plan at least partly because its agency was not permitted to receive
deposits in America and hence the banking authorities did not require
it to file reports on that phase of its business.75 There is adequate
precedent in seven states for authorizing such acceptance of deposits1
In addition, New York has its own models, although they never became
effective. In 1920, both houses of the legislature passed a bill"' which
permitted foreign banks to receive deposits. It was vetoed by Governor
Smith78 however, on the grounds that it inadequately protected depositors
and that domestic banks would have to compete with foreign ones on
unequal terms. Another bill7" passed the Assembly in 1923, but died
in the Senate. With these bills and statutes, and the lesson of the
National Bank of Greece as guides, the legislature may now be able to
the United States as well as of American banking in other countries, recommended equal
treatment of foreign branch banks with our own domestic establishments. Prmnes, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 204-209.
75. Record on Appeal, Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N. Y.
282, 22 N. E. (2d) 274 (1939).
76. Note 8 supra. In addition, Indiana allows banks of other states of the Union to
accept deposits. Note 19 supra. As protective measures, these statutes generally subject the
foreign banks to the supervision of, and examination by, the state banking department.
compel them to maintain reserves similar to those of domestic banks and require the
foreign banks to appoint the banking supervisor as attorney for service of process. Addi-
tional precautionary measures are: (1) Requirement for security deposit in trust for do-
mestic creditors, N. J. R v. STAT. (1937) tit. 17, § 15-3 (C); (2) Minimum capital and
surplus requirement, id. tit. 17, § 16-3 (b); (3) Provision that foreign banks segregate to,
or maintain in, the state the same amount of capital as is necessary to organize a separate
state bank, CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 652, § 7; Oar. Coon ., (1930) §§
1301, 1303; WAsi. R v. STAT. Ak'r-. (Remington, 1939) § 3248; (4) Condition that bank
can withdraw from state only after filing statement of obligations or property within the
state, bwr. STAT. ANx. (Burns, 1939) § 18-2321; Oar.. CooE A..m-. (Supp. 1935) § 22-1303.
77. S. 1920, Printed No. 2026. This bill empowered agencies in cities of more than
1,000,000 population to discount commercial paper, receive deposits and buy and sell
exchange, coin or bullion and lend money on real or personal security, if the assets of the
foreign bank exceeded its liabilities by $1,000,000 and the bank had a combined capital and
surplus of at least that amount. The agency could pay no interest on deposits above 3%,
and none at all on balances less than $3,000. It had to deposit securities with the super-
intendent of $200,000 in value, and had to comply with all regulations imposed on state
banks including reserve requirements.
7S. Pu nac PAPEHs or AL-'Rm E. Smr GoVOLVOR 1920 (N. Y. 1921) 326.
79. Assembly Bill 1923, Printed No. 2305. This bill gave the same powers as the 1920
bill supra, but limited them to banks of foreign countries. It bad similar protective pro-
visions. Moreover it prohibited interest on deposits of less than $5,M00, and required each
agency to keep separate books and records and preserve them for six years. In the event
of the cessation of the agency for any reason, creditors in the United States were preferred
as against the securities deposited with the superintendent.
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enact a law of this nature free from the fatal defects of its predecessors.
In light of the facts now known, it is submitted, the proper method
is the third alternative mentioned above. The principal problems are to
prevent the agencies from representing that they possess any of the for-
bidden powers, and to render violations more easily detectible; to elim-
nate the blending of an agency with a subsidiary and the resulting con-
fusion of functions; and to protect all American creditors of an agency
against the latter's withdrawal from the state without meeting its
obligations.
The first step demands that each foreign bank submit to the banking
department for approval in advance of publication copies of all of itq
advertisements and literature, including translations of those in foreign
languages. No foreign bank should refer to its agency as a "branch",
for this represents to the public that its New York establishment has
full banking powers. It does not appear entirely unfair to require all
agencies to indicate expressly that they cannot make discounts or receive
deposits.8" As an aid to inspection, all the bank's records in the United
States should be in English,8 and all foreign language notices and office
signs sub-titled in English. In regard to enforcement, it is interesting
to note that the present statute authorizes, but does not direct. the
superintendent to examine every agency as to activities forbidden.82 as
well as those allowed. This is a delicate matter, but the statute should
make such examination mandatory, and also require the agencies to
report periodically on the type of business they transact.
In instances where a foreign bank has both an agency and a domestic
subsidiary, the two must operate entirely separately. They should not
share offices, or have interlocking managements or personnels or adver-
tise jointly to an extent that may cause the two organizations to appear
as one. In the event the foreign bank cannot maintain two senarate
payrolls, it must choose one of the two vehicles for its American repre-
sentation. Then too, if it does have only a subsidiary, the dealing between,
the latter and its parent should be closely scrutinized, and their activities
divorced.
Under existing laws, an agency can withdraw from the state without
80. Cf. Tax. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 491, which permits certain foreign banks to con-
tinue to use their corporate name within the state, provided they add "without banking
powers".
81. N. Y. BAxxiNG LAW, former § 84 so provided. But N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 684, § 146
repealed it without providing a substitute.
82. N. Y. BANXING LAW § 36 (4). In the words of the statute the superintendent is
authorized to examine every agency "for the purpose of ascertaining whether it has
violated any law".
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any notice or formality whatever. No provision protects its creditors,
except Section 200 (3) of the Banking Law which provides that New
York residents who made contracts with the agency while it was doing
business here may get jurisdiction over the foreign bank by serving
process upon the Superintendent of Banks, even though the power of
attorney appointing him as agent for such service has been revoked.
This benefits residents only," and should extend to non-residents as well.
Even so, the jurisdiction may be illusory if the foreign corporation has
no property within the state, for even in peace time currency restrictions
seriously impede the realization of any domestic judgment sued upon in
a foreign nation. The customer who has dealt with the agency in New
York should not be sent abroad to look for assets. A statute should
compel the foreign bank to deposit a stated amount of cash or approved
securities with the superintendent in trust for such creditors, or file a
bond. To supplement this, a withdrawal procedure should require the
agency to file a sworn statement 4 of its debts with the superintendent,
and give public notice of the proposed discontinuance of its business,
advising all creditors to file claims with the banking department. Only
after a reasonable time has elapsed and the superintendent is satisfied
that all creditors have been paid should he issue a permit to withdraw
and return the assets deposited.
The Banking Laws are also vague as to the power of the courts to
appoint a receiver of the assets within the state of a foreign corporation
which is no longer licensed. As previously indicated,"5 the New York
Court of Appeals has held that an individual creditor cannot obtain such
appointment, but left open the question whether the superintendent can
assume charge of the assets. Unless the necessity for a receiver under
these circumstances is eliminated by the creation of a withdrawal pro-
cedure as herein suggested, the Legislature should speak affirmatively
on this point, and specify the rights of individuals in the event that the
superintendent refuses or fails to act.
Another phase of the law demands clarification. Sections 201, et seq.
of the Banking Law authorize an agency to transact the business of
"receiving money for transmission or transmitting the same by draft,
check, cable or otherwise". Under this provision an agency could claim
the right to sblicit and forward money to its home office abroad for
deposit there. The customer in response to an advertisement would
merely bring his money to the agency office in New York, and direct
83. See p. 354, supra.
84. Two states require such filing. See note 76 supra.
85. See pp. 355-356, supra.
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the agent to "transmit" the sum to the foreign office with advice for the
latter to keep it on deposit there. The home office on receipt would mail
a certificate of deposit directly to the customer, which certificate could
be made payable in the foreign country, in foreign money and subject
to foreign laws. 0 Such a transaction offends New York's policy as much
as, and presents "the same hazards as, the receipt of a deposit by the
agency itself in New York. Section 131 of the Banking Law probably
prohibits such dealings,87 but it is not clear. An amendment should state
the proscription unequivocally.
A dangerous gap in the Banking Laws does not concern the licensed
offices, but rather the unlicensed. A number of foreign banks which have
no agencies or subsidiaries here find it necessary to have some type of
representation in New York to protect their interests. They limit their
conduct presumably to non-banking activities, and have chosen either
to employ an individual representative, or have a licensed bank, usually
a foreign agency, act as their "representative office" or "agent". There
is no statutory sanction for this, but it is not prohibited, unless the
unlicensed bank engages in one or more of the transactions reserved for
domestic banks and licensed agencies,88 or unless in connection with the
business carried on it uses an office sign, letterhead or other printed
matter having thereon its corporate name, or other words indicating that
its business is that of a bank."
Obviously a representative can hardly represent without using its
principal's corporate name as an office sign, on letterheads, or as a
telephone listing. This has placed such representatives and foreign banks
in a dilemma. They must either incur an annual license expense of $250
or engage in questionable conduct. Since such a disbursement is un-
warranted in view of the limited business transacted, a number of them
have chosen the latter alternative. Perhaps this aberration seems harm-
86. This is the argument by which the National Bank of Greece sought to justify
its receipt of deposits in America described herein. See Record on Appeal, p. 56, Society
Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 254 App. Div. 728, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 1004 (1st
Dep't 1938). The obvious fallacy in such contention is that the certificates of deposit
were actually issued in New York before the money was sent anywhere, and the deposits
were made in response to solicitations for them at the "New York establishment" of the
foreign bank. See p. 353, supra.
87. This Section provides in part that no bank unless expressly authorized "shall em-
ploy any part of its property, or be in any way interested in any fund which shall be
employed for the purpose of receiving deposits."
88. N. Y. BANKING LAW § 131. See also id. § 517 relating to foreign "investment com-
panies".
89. Id. §§ 132, 180, OPINioN, ATT'y GEN. N. Y. (1922) 66. See note 53 and pp.
351, supra.
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less, but it may lead to serious disregard of the banking statutes and
widespread unauthorized banking. In fact, two of these "representatives"
have already offered to transmit monies to a foreign country, a pursuit
forbidden to unlicensed individuals and corporations."
The problem of these representatives and unlicensed corporations
should be solved. They might, for example, be permitted to use the
banking name of their principal with the prefix "Representative of",
either as an office sign, letterhead, or telephone listing. All banking
powers should be denied them, but they should be subjected to the
inspection of the banking department to assure compliance with the
prohibition. A minimum license fee adequate to defray the cost of
inspection should be assessed.9 Their offices should not be located with
any bank,92 and they should display a notice indicating the limitations
upon their authorized business.
Conclusion
From the above discussion, it appears that the present New York
legislation regulating foreign banks and its enforcement are based quite
clearly on the assumption that foreign bankers will obey the law rather
than violate it. This gives them the benefit of a doubt we are loath to
grant our domestic bankers. The activities of the National Bank of
Greece have proved that this assumption is unsafe. With international
morality now at a low ebb, this naive attitude should be discarded
entirely. The laws and their enforcement, whether or not they follow
one of the patterns suggested, should rest upon the realistic premise that
some foreign banks are apt to act contrary to our set standards. To this
prime consideration the other factors mentioned herein, though important
in themselves, should be subordinated.
90. See note 50 and p. 351, supra.
91. California is the only state which has a statute of this nature. CaL. Gmi;. Lxvs
(Deering, 1937) Act 652, § 12c. It permits a representative of a foreign corporation to
maintain an office in the state "as an office of a representative and not the place of
business of a bank or trust company"; the representative may wse a sign indicating such
place is the office of a representative of a foreign bank or trust company, and may use
the latters' circulars, letterheads and other printed matter. The representative must have
a license from the superintendent and pay an annual fee of $50. At present, of the five
authorized representatives in California all are from banks of other states in the United
States. THITIrm AxNUAL REPORT op THS SUPrImmEND-T OF B;ns or Tim Sr,= or
CALiFONNA (1939) 193.
92. Cf. N. Y. BAN=ING LAw § 163, which places a similar restriction on private bankers.
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